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Abstract—As smart grids are getting popular and being widely
implemented, preserving the privacy of consumers is becoming
more substantial. Power generation and pricing in smart grids
depends on the continuously gathered information from the
consumers. However, having access to the data relevant to the
electricity consumption of each individual consumer is in conflict
with its privacy. One common approach for preserving privacy is
to aggregate data of different consumers and to use their smart-
meters for calculating the bills. But in this approach, malicious
consumers who send erroneous data to take advantage or disrupt
smart grid cannot be identified. In this paper, we propose a
new statistical-based scheme for data gathering and billing in
which the privacy of consumers is preserved, and at the same
time, if any consumer with erroneous data can be detected. Our
simulation results verify these matters.
Index Terms—Smart grid, Supplier, Data aggregator, Privacy,
Statistical, Correlation coefficient.
I. INTRODUCTION
RECENTLY, the traditional power grids underwent analteration to smart grids which leads to several benefits
including enhanced reliability and resilience, higher intelli-
gence and optimized control, decentralized operation, higher
operational efficiency, more efficient demand management,
better power quality, and fraud detection [10]. The smart
grid is envisaged to be the next generation of the traditional
grid. In smart grid, the consumers minimize their expenses
while providers maximize their revenue, hence, a win-win
partnership can be achieved.
On the contrary to the traditional grids, there is a bidirec-
tional information flow between suppliers and consumers in
smart grids rather than a centralized unidirectional system.
This feature enables the supplier to generate the electricity
based on the demand; and at the same time, the supplier can
define dynamic billing tariff, and regard to these tariffs that
are sent to consumer periodically (e.g. every 15 minutes), each
consumer decides whether to decrease or increase its power
consumption. Thus, electricity is consumed in a more efficient
manner. In the other direction of information flow in smart
grids, consumers declare their need for electricity or their
power consumption; indeed, consumers send their momentary
electricity usage to the suppliers. As a result, unlike traditional
grids, in smart grids suppliers provide electricity based on the
demands of consumers to avoid wasting power [2].
In order to provide two-way communication in smart grid,
the consumers should be equipped with smart meters by which
Alireza Ahadipour, Mojtaba Mohammadi, and Alireza Keshavarz-Haddad
are with the School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Shiraz Uni-
versity, Shiraz, Iran. Email: {ahadipour.alireza, mojtaba.mohammadi, and
keshavarz}@shirazu.ac.ir
they can measure their usage and send/receive messages over
communication links such as power-line, cable, fibre, or radio.
The classic approach for billing is to gather all power
consumption information in a center, i.e., the consumers send
their electricity usage to a server which is responsible for
gathering data periodically by means of smart meters and
then, the server dispatches the gathered information to a local
or central database. The electricity bill for each consumer is
calculated based on records of the consumers in the database.
Criticism to this scheme is that the privacy is not preserved.
As each individual consumer sends its usage, the pattern of
its power consumption is apparent to the center; for instance,
inhabitants personal schedules, habits, religion, and so on [20],
[22].
Another trivial approach for billing is that the supplier sends
time-varying tariffs periodically to the consumers and their
smart-meters compute the electricity consumption price over a
defined period (e.g. one month) based on the received tariffs.
Eventually, at the end of each period, every consumer only
sends its total billing amount to the supplier. In this case, the
privacy of each consumer would be preserved; however, sup-
plier cannot verify consumers’ billing reports. Consequently,
some malicious consumers would take advantage or distrust
smart grid by sending incorrect information on their power
usages. In this case, historical analysis of electricity usage
reports would not be useful for identifying malicious users.
For instance, if the power consumption pattern of a consumer
alters over time, this consumer would be considered as a
consumer who is declaring incorrect information; while a
malicious consumer who ever sends artificial data cannot be
easily identified [33].
According to the aforementioned scenarios, the main chal-
lenge in communications between consumers and suppliers
is preserving the privacy of consumers while identifying
any malicious consumer in the smart grid. To address this
challenge, we propose a new scheme called statistical-based
privacy preserving (SBPP). An earlier version of SBPP was
presented in [1]. Notably, the present work completes our
previous paper and provides more technical details and adds
some new ideas for data gathering and fraud detection.
The proposed scheme enables privacy preserving data gath-
ering and detecting the malicious consumers possible at the
same time. SBPP exhibits an efficient solution for privacy
preserving in terms of computation complexity and communi-
cation overhead. The key idea in SBPP scheme is to combine
usages of different consumers at local data aggregators (to
preserve privacy) and also sending accurate usage of some
randomly selected consumers to the supplier. Then the sup-
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2plier uses the data of accurate usage of different consumers
over random periods of time to detect malicious consumers.
Simulation results verify that SBPP is reliable for detecting
malicious consumers in different sabotaging scenarios.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In
Section II, we briefly discuss related works. In Section III,
the system model is introduced. In Section IV, we describe
our proposed statistical-based scheme for data gathering in
smart grid. In section V, the simulation results of the proposed
scheme are presented. Finally, we conclude the paper in
Section VI.
II. RELATED WORKS
Recently, many researchers have paid attention to privacy-
preserving solutions for smart grids. In this section, we briefly
review some proposed schemes for privacy-preserved data
gathering in smart grids.
In [32] authors propose an algorithm for data collection
with self-awareness protection. The paper considers some
data aggregators and consumers in a smart grid where some
of the respondents may not participate in contributing their
personal data or submit erroneous data. To overcome this
issue a self-awareness protocol is proposed to enhance trust of
the respondents when sending their personal data to the data
aggregators. In this scheme, all consumers collaborate with
each other to preserve the privacy. They have hired an idea,
which allows respondents to know protection level before the
data submission process is initiated. The work is motivated
by [9] and [13]. In [9], co-privacy (co-operative privacy) is
introduced. Co-privacy claims that best solution to achieve
privacy is to help other parties to achieve their privacy.
Many papers study self-oriented privacy protection methods.
For example, [14] introduces self-enforcing privacy (SEP) for
e-polling. In SEP scheme, supplier allows the consumers to
track their submitted data in order to protect their privacy.
In this case, the consumers can accuse the supplier based on
data they gathered during the collection process. Following
this idea, a fair approach for accusation is presented in [28].
In [18], a respondent-defined privacy protection (RDPP) is
introduced. It means that respondents are allowed to determine
their required privacy protection level before delivering data to
data collector. Unlike other methods in which data aggregators
decide about the privacy protection level, in this scheme the
consumers can freely define the privacy protection level.
There are also some other researches on privacy-preserving
data collection. For instance, in [30] authors design a balanced
anonymity and traceability for outsourcing small-scale linear
data aggregation (called BAT-LA) in smart grid. Anonymity
means that consumers identity should be kept secret and trace-
ability means that imposter consumers should be traced. Here
an important challenge is that many devices are not capable
of handling required complicated computations. Hence, they
have hired the idea of outsourcing computations with the help
of public cloud. The paper utilizes elliptic curve cryptography
and proxy re-encryption to make BAT-LA secure. BAT-LA is
evaluated by comparing it with two other schemes, RVK [31],
and LMO [25] and it is shown that BAT-LA is more efficient
in terms of confidentiality.
The papers [30] and [8] focus on outsourcing to clouds
or distributed systems. For encryption process, it is important
to use a secure key management scheme. The cryptographic
technique ensures that no privacy sensitive information would
be revealed. But, there is still the challenge of how to effi-
ciently query encrypted multidimensional metering data stored
in an untrusted heterogeneous distributed system environment.
[17] addresses this issue and introduces a high performance
and privacy-preserving query (P2Q) scheme which provides
confidentiality and privacy in a semi-trusted environment.
To obtain privacy of residential consumers, a scheme named
APED is proposed in [29]. The paper employs a pairwise
private stream aggregation. The scheme achieves privacy pre-
serving aggregation and also executes error detection when
some nodes fail to function normally. DG-APED is an im-
proved form of APED, suggested in [26]. DG-APED pro-
pounds diverse grouping-based protocol with error detection.
This research added differential privacy technique to APED.
Moreover, DG-APED has an advantage of being efficient in
terms of communication and computation overhead compared
to APED.
In [16], the authors present a new kind of attack, which ad-
versary extracts information about the presence or absence of
a consumer to access the smart meter information. The attack
is called human-factor-aware differential aggregation (HDA)
and it is claimed that other proposed schemes cannot handle
it. To solve this issue, the authors introduce two privacy-
preserving schemes which can stand out against HDA attack
by transmitting encrypted measurements to an aggregator in
a way that aggregator cannot steal any information of human
activities.
PDA is a privacy-preserving dual-functional aggregation
scheme in which, every consumer disseminates only one data
and then supplier computes two statistical averages (mean
and variance) of all consumers [19]. The paper shows by
simulations that PDA possesses low computational complex-
ity and communication overheads. In another work, the au-
thors introduce privacy-preserving data aggregation with fault-
tolerance called PDAFT [6]. If PDAFT is implemented, a
strong adversary is not able to gain any information, even in
the case of compromising a few servers at the supplier. Like
PDA, PDAFT has relatively high communication overhead and
is tenacious against many security threats. In PDAFT scheme,
if some consumers or servers fail, it can still work correctly.
DPAFT [4] is another privacy-preserving data collection
scheme which supports both differential privacy and fault
tolerance at the same time. It is claimed that, DPAFT surpass
other schemes in many aspects, such as storage cost, com-
putation complexity, utility of differential privacy, robustness
of fault tolerance, and the efficiency of consumer addition or
removal [4]. A new malfunctioning data aggregation scheme,
named MuDA, is introduced in [7]. The scheme is resistant
to differential attacks and keeps consumers information secret
with an acceptable noise rate. PDAFT [7], DPAFT [4], and
MuDA [7], shows nearly same characteristics with differences
on their cryptographic methods [12]. PDAFT employs homo-
morphic Paillier cryptosystem [23], while DPAFT and MUDA
use Boneh-Goh-Nissim cryptosystem [5].
3In [11] authors present a secure power usage data aggre-
gation method for smart grid where the supplier understands
usage of each neighborhood and makes decision about energy
distribution, while it has no idea of the individual electricity
consumption of each consumer. This method is designed
to barricade internal attacks and provide batch verification.
Authors of [15] found out that [11] has the weakness of
key leakage and the imposter can obtain the private key of
consumer easily. It is proved that by using the protocol in
[15], key leakage problem is solved and a better performance
in terms of computational cost is achieved. Neglecting energy
cost is the main disadvantage of this method.
In [8], a privacy-preserving protocol for smart grid is
presented which outsources computations to cloud servers. In
this protocol, the data is encrypted before outsourcing and
consequently cloud can perform any computations without
decryption. [3] adopts perturbation techniques to preserve
privacy and uses perturbation techniques and cryptosystems
at the same time. It is designed in a way to be suitable for
hardware-limited devices. Evaluations show that it is resilient
to two types of attack: filtering attack, and true value attack.
Authors of [24] explain how for privacy preserving an indi-
vidual meter of a consumer can share its readings to multiple
consumers, and how a consumer can receive meter readings
from multiple meters. They propose a polynomial-based pro-
tocol for pricing. In [27] a security protocol called TPS3
is introduced which uses Temporal Perturbation and Shamirs
Secret Sharing (SSS) to guarantees privacy and reliability of
consumers data. In [21], data collector tries to preserve privacy
by adding some random noise to its computation result. To
overcome the problem of computation accuracy reduction,
an approximation method is proposed in [21] which leads
to obtain a closed form of aggregators decision problem. In
[34], a slightly different scenario is considered in which a
data aggregator collects data from consumers and then spreads
data to supplier. The goal is to preserve consumers data
privacy. Anonymization might be an answer, but it has its own
challenges. To achieve a tradeoff between privacy protection
and data utility, interactions among three elements of scenario
(consumers, data aggregator, and supplier) is modelled as a
game and the Nash equilibria of the game is found.
In this paper we use the idea of aggregating data of different
consumers for persevering the privacy of each individual con-
sumer. The proposed SBPP scheme applies a simple statistical
method for identifying the malicious consumers who send
erroneous data to the aggregator in order to take advantage
or disrupt smart grid. SBPP does not require any change on
consumer side and communication infrastructure. It possesses
very low computational overhead in aggregators and billing
center in order to preserve privacy and detect malicious
consumers. Therefore, SBPP is practical in the sense that it
can be easily implemented on the existing infrastructure of
smart grids.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we present our system model. The essential
elements of our proposed scheme include:
Consumer: those who consume energy in a power grid.
Benign consumer: a consumer who reported its power
consumption correctly.
Malicious consumer: a consumer who reported its power
consumption incorrectly due to some purposes such as fraud
(power theft) or disruptive goals (power loss).
Supplier: an entity whose responsibility is to provide energy
for power consumers in a region.
Data aggregator: a local facility whose liability is gath-
ering the amount of power consumption information from
consumers periodically and dispatching the gathered data to
the supplier.
Electricity leakage: the difference between the actual
amount of consumed energy and the sum of quantity reported
by consumers as their power consumption.
We consider a power grid consisting of M regions where
each region comprises one data aggregator. Denote the number
of consumers in the j’th region by nj for j = 1, . . . ,M .
Assume that the consumers send their power consumption
information measured by the smart meters to the local ag-
gregators. The aggregators are responsible of gathering local
data and sending some information regarding the usage of the
consumers to the power supplier.
It is assumed that data aggregators are trusted. Indeed, no
information leakage occurs at data aggregators, supposedly
because after aggregation takes place, no raw information
concerning power consumption of consumers would be at
hand. Besides, we assume that communications among the
above entities of smart grid are secured. This means that
the submitted data by a consumer cannot be altered in the
communication infrastructure, i.e., the erroneous data would
be only generated by a consumer itself.
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME
Although the accuracy of smart grids’ performance is en-
gaged with the correctness of data gathered from consumers,
this data gathering should not violate the privacy of consumers.
Here we propose a new privacy-preserving data gathering
scheme with the purpose of informing the supplier of the
instant power consumption. The proposed scheme provides
the power usage information for the supplier while keeping
the consumers’ power consumption information private and
more importantly, finds malicious consumers in the process.
The proposed scheme possesses very low computational com-
plexity and communication overhead on the smart grid in
comparison with the existing methods.
A. Data Gathering in SBPP
Here we present Statistical-Based Privacy-Preserving
Scheme (SBPP) for data gathering in smart grids. SBPP
gathers the information in the following steps:
1. Consumers report their power consumption periodically
to the local data aggregator.
2. At each time period, the aggregator computes the total
amount of power consumption based on the gathered data
from the consumers. It also randomly selects the reported
value of one the consumers.
43. The aggregator sends the total power consumption value
along with the name and reported value the selected
consumer to the supplier.
5. The supplier provides energy based on the reports of the
aggregators and stores the reported values for randomly
selected consumers.
Fig. 1 depicts how data gathering takes place.
Here it is assumed that data aggregators are trusted and the
power consumption data is not at hand any more after being
summed up by the data aggregators. Based on this assumption,
instead of having access to power consumption data of each
individual consumer at any period of time, a little portion of
information is available about the power consumption of each
consumer.
As an example, suppose there are 100 consumers in a
region with one data aggregator and let the period of data
gathering be 15 minutes. Without this data gathering algorithm
mechanism, a consumer should send its power consumption
information to the supplier 30 ∗ 24 ∗ 60/15 = 2880 times in
a month. By employing our scheme for data gathering, on
average 2880/100 = 28.8 values in regards to the power
consumption of each consumer is available at the supplier
in an analogous period of time. Although it may seem that
having access to power consumption information of consumers
is in contradiction with their privacy, availability of these
information 28 times a month on random periods would not
reveal any data concerning their life style compared with
approachability of these information 2880 times within a
month.
B. Detecting Malicious Consumers
Malicious consumers pursue two distinct aims by sending
erroneous data to suppliers. Either they declare their amount of
power consumption lower than their real consumed power in
order to pay less fee; or, they report their power consumption
quantity much higher to impose more expenditure to the
supplier.
In this paper, we get use of Pearson correlation coefficient
of power consumption of consumers in order to find malicious
consumers in each region who try to send erroneous data to
the supplier.
Pearson correlation coefficient illustrates the statistical rela-
tionship between two variables and it is defined as follows:
corr(x, y) =
cov(x, y)√
var(x) · var(y) (1)
where corr is a widely used alternative notation for the
correlation coefficient and cov means covariance.
Correlation coefficient possesses values in the range of
[−1,+1], where +1 and −1 indicate the strongest possible
agreement and disagreement respectively.
In order to find malicious consumers, it is assumed that data
aggregators are aware of the total amount of power consumed
in each region. By comparing this amount with the aggregated
quantity declared by consumers, the electricity leakage value
(shortage) can be determined.
Having access to merely one quantity of power consumption
information corresponding to a consumer does not suffice
to distinguish if that consumer is benign or malicious. In
other words, the more information we have regarding power
consumption of each consumer, the better decision we can
make about the sabotage of consumers. Thus, the scheme
for finding malicious consumers can take place at the end of
month or after a few months.
In order to detect malicious consumers, each data aggregator
stores the identity (ID) of the randomly selected consumer, its
reported power consumption (r), and the electricity leakage
amount of power consumed in that region at every period (l).
Then for each consumer, the data aggregator computes the
correlation coefficient of its reported consumed energy and the
leakage values of power consumption. The leakage quantity is
defined as:
l = c− r (2)
where c and r are the actual and reported power consumption
values respectively.
It is straightforward to see that the correlation coefficient
turns to 0 for benign consumers, since the leakage value
is statistically independent from the power consumption of
a benign consumer. Now if the correlation coefficient turns
to +1 for a consumer, this means that (according to (2))
the consumer is reporting its power consumption less than
its actual used power. On the other hand, if the correlation
coefficient for a consumer turns to −1, it means that consumer
is declaring its power consumption more than its usage due to
some subversive goals. Thus, SBPP scheme is capable of not
only detecting malicious consumers, but also comprehending
if that consumer is declaring its amount of power consumption
less or more than its actual quantity.
Next, we study the performance of SPBB for some scenarios
based on the number of malicious consumers in each region
and the behavior of attackers.
1) Scenario I: Existence of at most one malicious consumer
in each region:
Suppose that there exists at most one malicious consumer
in each region. According to the declared quantity of power
consumption of consumers, three cases could be considered:
It should be stated that in all of the following formulas,
all the variables are zero-mean. Indeed, the mean-value of all
variables are subtracted from their real values. Throughout the
paper, zero-mean vectors are depicted as x¯.
Case I: Malicious consumer reports a portion/multiple of
its actual usage: In this case, the reported quantities by
the malicious consumer would undoubtedly have correlation
with leakage amounts. Consider an arbitrary consumer, and
let vectors (r) and (l) be the zero-mean vectors containing
reported values of that consumer and the corresponding elec-
tricity leakage amounts on those periods. Here, the correlation
coefficient for each consumer would be written as:
corr(r¯, l¯) =
r¯T l¯
‖r¯‖‖¯l‖ (3)
In this case, the malicious consumer reports a por-
tion/multiple of its consumed energy, i.e., r = αc, where α is
a positive coefficient, α > 0. Thus, by getting use of (2), for
5Fig. 1. The total power consumption is calculated by aggregators in each region and sent to the supplier. Let rij be the reported consumed power by consumer
i in region j and kj denotes the index of randomly chosen consumer in region j.
a malicious consumer, the correlation coefficient in (3) would
be as:
corr(r¯, l¯) =
r¯T l¯
‖r¯‖‖¯l‖
=
αc¯T (1− α)c¯
|α|‖c¯‖|1− α|‖c¯‖
=
α(1− α)‖c¯‖2
|α||1− α|‖c¯‖2 (4)
=
α(1− α)
|α||1− α|
As stated before, when the malicious consumer reports its
power consumption less than its actual quantity, 0 < α < 1,
the correlation coefficient turns to +1, and on the contrary, the
correlation coefficient turns to -1 when the malicious consumer
declares its consumed energy more than its actual usage, α >
1.
Case II: Malicious consumer adds/subtracts a fixed quantity
to/from its actual usage: In this case, the reported quantity
by the malicious consumer is independent from the leakage
amount until the actual consumed energy lies below the fixed
value (η) which is added/subtracted to/from the actual power
usage. Indeed, as the reported consumed energy cannot be neg-
ative, the reported quantity and the corresponding electricity
leakage for each period could be written as:
r =
{
c− η if c ≥ η
0 if c < η
(5)
l =
{
η if c ≥ η
c if c < η
(6)
While the actual consumed energy in each period is greater
than the fixed threshold η, c ≥ η, these terms become inde-
pendent and thus, the malicious consumer cannot be detected.
On the other hand, while the consumed power is less than
the threshold, c ≤ η, the malicious consumer would report its
consumed energy zero and thus, the reported consumed power
would be dependent to the leakage quantity. Consequently, by
focusing on the measurements where r is small, we can still
detect the malicious consumer.
Case III: Malicious consumer adds/subtracts a random
quantity to/from its actual usage: Assume that the malicious
consumer adds/subtracts a random value independent from
its power consumption to/from its consumed energy such
that none of its reported quantities turns to a non-negative
value. In this case, although the declared amounts of power
consumption are quite independent from the electricity leakage
corresponding to them at each period, the proposed scheme is
capable of detecting the malicious consumer as well.
corr(r¯, l¯) =
r¯T l¯
‖r¯‖‖r¯‖
=
(c¯− θ¯)T θ¯
‖c¯− θ¯‖‖θ¯‖
=
c¯T θ¯
‖c¯− θ¯‖‖θ¯‖ −
‖θ¯‖
‖c¯− θ¯‖ (7)
where θ¯ is a vector containing random values (θs)
added/subtracted to/from the reported quantity. While c¯ and
θ¯ are independent, the first term in (7) would be equal
to zero and thus, the correlation coefficient corresponding
to the malicious consumer turns to a negative quantity. As
the correlation coefficient quantities corresponding to benign
consumers revolve around 0, the malicious consumer should
take the smallest negative quantity amongst others.
2) Scenario II: Existence of more than one malicious con-
sumer in each region:
Furthermore, it is possible that there are more than one
malicious consumer in a region. In this case, although the cor-
relation coefficient corresponding to these consumers would
6not be equal to ±1, their correlation coefficient can be still
distinguished from other consumers. As a result, it is needed
that a threshold (th) must be defined where the absolute value
of correlation coefficients fewer or more than the threshold
indicate benign or malicious consumers respectively, as:
malicious consumer, if − 1 ≤ corr ≤ −th
benign consumer, if − th < corr < th
malicious consumer, if th ≤ corr ≤ 1
(8)
It is apparent that for higher threshold value, fewer mali-
cious consumers are detected and on the other hand, lower
threshold value, more benign consumers are considered as
malicious consumers. Thus, a question that arises here is that
how a proper threshold be found? The analysis concerning the
detection of several malicious consumers with small number
of samples for each consumer, is out of scope of this paper,
however, we briefly discuss the problem in the next section.
In this paper, according to the setting of the problem, we set
the threshold to a fixed value, namely, 0.5.
As the proposed scheme is a statistical technique, it is
probable that the correlation coefficient of a benign consumer
lies out of its defined region depicted in (8), or vice versa.
C. Billing
Here we describe billing procedure in SBPP scheme. The
accountability for billing is handled by data aggregators. As
discussed in the last section, malicious consumers can be
identified by analyzing the correlation coefficient of each
consumer in the region. Malicious consumers’ being detected,
the sent data corresponding to other consumers are considered
trustworthy and error free. Based on this assumption, the
liability for billing can be assigned to data aggregators. In
every period, consumers send their amount of consumed
energy to data aggregators. Then, based on the received data
from the consumers and the received tariffs from the supplier,
the data aggregators compute the cost of consumed power for
each consumer before data aggregation takes place. In each
period, data aggregators calculate the cost of consumed power
for each consumer and add the cost to the previously calculated
cost for that consumer and by the end of month, a bill will
be issued and sent to the supplier’s accounting center. Note
that the task of computing the bills can be assigned to the
smart-meters as well.
Not only this scheme decreases the signalling overhead, but
also the privacy of consumers will be protected. It is merely
required that suppliers send tariffs periodically to data ag-
gregators and to consumers simultaneously. Data aggregators
compute the cost of consuming energy for every consumer
and smart meters on the consumers’ side adjust the power
consumption based on the received tariffs, i.e., when the tariff
increases, smart meters force dispensable devices to be turned
off. In this case, no information leakage and thus no privacy
invasion would occur.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we describe our simulation results for the
proposed SBPP scheme. The results verify that SBPP scheme
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Fig. 2. Correlation coefficient of the reported consumed energy and the
leakage amounts of power consumption for all consumers in the grid. (a) The
scenario where malicious consumer declare its power consumption less than
the actual quantity and (b) the scenario where malicious consumer declare its
power consumption more than the actual quantity
is capable of detecting malicious consumers who send bogus
information concerning their power consumption.
Although in reality there exists a dependency between
power consumption of consumers in every successive periods,
in all simulations we consider a random power consumption
for each consumer in each period, which is the worst case
that could be considered. We show that our proposed method
works properly in this case and thus could be applied in real
world smart grid.
Here, the previously described scenarios are investigated.
A. Case I: Malicious consumer multiplies its usage
In the following, all simulations are considered based on this
assumption. Consider a region consisting of 100 consumers
and one data aggregator where data aggregation takes place ev-
ery 15 minutes. Assume that the consumer #25 is a malicious
consumer. Two cases are studied; consumer #25 in scenario
(i) reports one tenth (0.1) of its power consumption and in
scenario (ii) it declares its power usage 10 times more than
its actual consumption. Fig. 2 (a) illustrates scenario (i) where
the correlation coefficient of reported consumed energy and
the leakage amounts of power consumption turns to +1 and
Fig. 2 (b) depicts scenario (i) where the correlation coefficient
turns to −1.
Note that henceforth, all the assumptions are analogous to
that of Fig. 2 where consumer #25 is the malicious consumer
unless mentioned otherwise.
Next, we assume that there are three malicious consumers:
#25, #50, and #75. Consumers with IDs #25 and #75
declare their power consumption less than their actual con-
sumption and consumer #50 reports its power consumption
more than its actual consumed energy. By setting the threshold
to 0.5, consumers with absolute value of correlation coefficient
greater than 0.5, i.e. |corr| ≥ 0.5, would be considered
malicious, as depicted in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 3. Existence of more than one malicious consumer. (a) all malicious
consumer are detected correctly, (b) in addition to malicious consumers, a
number of benign consumers are found malicious, and (c) not all malicious
consumers are detected.
As it can be seen from Fig. 3, fixed threshold will result
in three cases: 1) only malicious consumers been detected
(Fig. 3 (a)), 2) in addition to malicious consumers, some
benign consumers found malicious (Fig. 3 (b)), and 3) a subset
of malicious consumers been detected (Fig. 3 (c)).
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Fig. 4. The effect of increasing in the number of samples on the detection
rate. Fig. 4 (a) and Fig. 4 (b) illustrate the correlation coefficient of consumers
within a month and a year respectively.
As the proposed scheme is a statistical method, it is apparent
that the more data be at hand, the more accurate the decision
would be. Fig. 4 illustrates this matter. In Fig. 4 (a), one month
is considered as the period of measurement. On the other hand,
the period of one year is considered in Fig. 4 (b). In this case,
the number of samples has increased 12 times. As a result,
as it can be seen from Fig. 4 (b), the correlation coefficient
corresponding to benign consumers revolves more densely
around zero and the correlation coefficient corresponding to
the malicious consumer (consumer #25) lies far apart from
others compared to Fig. 4 (a).
B. Case II: Malicious consumer adds/subtracts a fixed quan-
tity
Here we assume that the malicious consumers add/subtract
the fixed quantity η to/from the amount of consumed energy.
This is independent from the actual usage of malicious con-
sumer, detection of malicious consumer would be associated
with those reported quantities that are equal to zero. This mat-
ter will result in the fact that detection of malicious consumers
get more harder than the previous case, as illustrated in Fig. 5.
More importantly, as it can be seen from Fig. 5, the correlation
coefficient corresponding to the malicious consumer does not
turn to +1.
It can be seen from Fig. 5 that the correlation coefficient
corresponding to the malicious consumer is far close to that of
benign consumers. As stated before, this matter would made
detection of the malicious consumer tough. Fig. 6 illustrates
this matter. As depicted in Fig. 6, the more samples we have
corresponding to power consumption of consumers, the more
accurate we are in detection of the malicious consumer. As
it can be seen, by increasing the period of measurement, the
probability of detecting the malicious consumer approaches to
1, while for the period of one month this probability revolves
around 0.5.
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Fig. 5. The correlation coefficient of the malicious consumer is to 1.
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Fig. 6. The probability of detection of malicious consumer improves as the
duration of report analysis grow.
In each iteration, the simulation is repeated 100 times and
the probability of correct detection of malicious consumer is
calculated.
C. Case III: Malicious consumer adds/subtracts a random
quantity
In this section the simulation regarding the third scenario
is brought where malicious consumer adds/subtracts a random
quantity to its reported consumed energy. As mentioned be-
fore, according to (7), the lowest negative quantity for the
correlation coefficient expresses the malicious consumer, as
depicted in Fig. 7. Note that assumptions are similar to that of
Fig. 2 where consumer #25 is the malicious consumer unless
mentioned otherwise.
The performance of our SBPP scheme in the three men-
tioned cases is evaluated in Table I. Here, the simulation is
repeated 1000 times and the number of correct detections had
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Fig. 7. The correlation coefficient corresponding to benign and malicious
consumers. The malicious consumer has the lowest correlation coefficient.
TABLE I
PROBABILITY OF CORRECT DETECTION
Period of measurement
1 month 3 months 6 months 1 year
Case I 1 1 1 1
Case II 0.51 0.98 1 1
Case III 0.92 1 1 1
been counted and finally the probability of correct detection
had been calculated.
VI. CONCLUSION
We presented a statistical-based approach for data gathering
in smart grids which preserves the privacy of consumers in the
grid. We investigated the capability of the proposed scheme
in detecting malicious consumers who dispatch bogus data
to suppliers for a specific purpose such as abating their cost
or imposing expenditure on them (subversive goals). Further-
more, we showed that when there exists at most one malicious
consumer in each data gathering region, that consumer can
be definitely detected. We consider three distinct cases for
sabotage goals and show that our proposed method works
properly in all cases. However, when the number of malicious
consumers in a region grow, our statistical method would
detect some benign consumers as malicious, or some malicious
consumers remain undetected.
We then presented an algorithm for billing which concede
the liability of billing to data aggregators in each region.
By doing this, not only the signalling overhead decreases
significantly, but also billing occurs at a trusted entity where
malicious consumers are distinguished from benign ones. Our
simulation results verified these terms.
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